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Ownership
It is not so long ago that a vast amount of property which had
no previous value of any consequence, became the subject of extensive litigation involving every phase of property law. The swamps
and the wastelands and every sort of water bottom received a full
legal treatment and respectable classification. The cases are now
thinning out and getting down to some of the more specific details.
Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Case'7 was a concursus proceeding to determine the ownership of certain oil royalties, which in
turn depended upon the ownership of the property from which the
oil was produced. The land was alluvion or accretion which had
accumulated gradually to a riparian property, but there was dispute
as to whether it was on Grand Lake or on the body of water called
the Arm of Grand Lake. It has already been decreed that Grand
Lake itself is a navigable lake, and that its bed belongs to the
state.' 8 Since the law of accretion' 9 applies to the shores of rivers and
streams, the natural question is how to draw the line between the
two bodies of water where one flows into the other. Still the court
must decide cases, and in the present case they followed their prior
decision regarding the adjacent lot,2" that the land in question was
on the Arm of Grand Lake which was classified as a navigable
stream, and that the accretion belonged to the riparian proprietor.
PRESCRIPTION

Joseph Dainow*
Acquirendi causa
In Meridian Land & Mineral Corporation v. Bagents,' two petitory actions were brought by the record owners of a certain property. The defendants were in physical possession and they pleaded
ownership by virtue of the thirty-year prescription. The basic concept of acquisitive prescription is possession, and this concept is
quite different from actual physical control of the property. In the
present case, there was evidence that the defendants' ancestor had
fenced the land about 1911 and used it as a pasture. However, there
17. 210 La. 630, 2q So. (2d) 431 (1946).
18. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937).
19. Art. 509, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14
So. (2d) 61 (1943).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 627, 30 So. (2d) 563 (1947).
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was also evidence that he did so with the consent and permission
of the then record owner. Under such circumstances, actual use of
land cannot commence a possession for prescription, because any
physical relationship to property which is predicated upon an inherent acknowledgment of somebody else's ownership is merely a precarious possession and not the requisite "possession as owner." In
addition, Article 3500 requires (among other things) that this possession as owner be "unequivocal," which burden was not discharged
by the defendant. In the present case, there were also other corroborating circumstances, such as the defendants' failure to have the
property assessed in their name, as well as the fact that the taxes
were actually paid by the plaintiffs. Likewise, a 1940 transfer of the
succession property described other specific property but failed to
mention the land in dispute.
"Just title" is another very technical concept, and in the case of
Everett v. Clayton' an unusual situation was analysed carefully. The
property involved had been acquired by the defendant in 1910 by
way of succession from his father. The plaintiffs appeared in 1943
as other legal heirs whose existence had been hitherto unknown to
the defendant. The defendant's plea of ten-year prescription acquirendi causa was not based on the court judgment recognizing him
as sole heir to his father, because that mode of acquisition is not
translative of ownership as it must be in order to constitute a just
title. However, in 1923 the defendant sold the property to an uncle,
and in 1925 it was sold back to him; both of these transactions were
in legal good'faith.
The plaintiffs contended that the defendant could not, by this
transfer and retransfer, improve his title which was no good. However, the court clearly outlined the full analysis of what had occurred, and properly held that each of these two deeds fulfilled the
requirements of a just title, and that there had been a continuous
possession (by tacking) since 1923, as well as more than ten years
on the basis of the second deed alone. Of course, the element of
good faith was indispensable and was fully established without dispute. While one person cannot convey to another a title better than
his own, it is the very nature of acquisitive prescription to cure a
defective title where the deed is valid in form.
2. 211 La. 211, 29 So. (2d) 769 (1947).
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Liberandi causa
In the absence of questions regarding interruption or suspension, the application of the rules of liberative prescription may sometimes be relatively as simple as the calendar computation of the
required lapse of time. Even so, there are nevertheless questions on
which a major dispute can arise. One of these is the determination
of the starting point for the computation, as illustrated in the case
of Lake Front Land Company v. Department of Highways.' In
1926 the plaintiff expected to derive certain benefits to its land from
the construction of a proposed highway, and deposited in escrow
$50,000 to pay for the construction of a muck canal and embankment. The highway was never built and when the plaintiff sued in
1945 to recover its money, the defendant pleaded the liberative prescription of ten years against personal actions.4 The fundamental
theory of this prescription is the loss of a right by reason of failure
to use it during a period when it could have been exercised. Thus,
liberative prescription could not have commenced to run from the
time when the money was put up in 1926 because there was no
right then to demand its return. It was not until a formal report
in 1938 that the highway project was abandoned, and it was not
until 1943 that the plaintiff was informed of this action. Since both
of these dates were well within the ten years prior to suit, the court
dismissed the prescription plea. In the light of basic principles, it
might be stated more specifically that it was not until 1943 that there
was any delinquency in the exercise of an existing right.
SALE

Alvin B. Rubin*
Nature of the Contract
The Civil Code defines the contract of sale as "an agreement by
which one gives a thing for a price in current money."1 The "contract of rent of lands" (rente fonci~re), on the other hand "is a contract by which one of the parties conveys . ..to the other a tract
of land ... and stipulates that the latter shall hold it as owner, but

reserving to the former an annual rent of a certain sum of money,
or of a certain quantity of fruits, which the other party binds himself
to pay him."2
3. 81 So. (2d) 280 (La. 1947).
4. Art., 8544, La. Civil Code of 1870.
*Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 2439, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 2779, La. Civil Code of 1870.

